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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unparalleled global crisis. Yet, despite the grave adversity faced by citizens,
incumbents around the world experienced a boost in popularity during the onset of the outbreak. In this
study, we examine how the response to the COVID-19 outbreak in one country affected incumbent sup-
port in other countries. Specifically, we leverage the fact that the first country-wide lockdown on European
soil, in Italy on 9 March 2020, happened during the fieldwork of surveys conducted in four other
European countries, France, Germany, Poland and Spain. This allows us to examine how an event abroad
that alerted citizens to an imminent crisis—prior to a similar domestic government response—influenced
incumbent support. Our results indicate a crisis signal effect of Italy’s COVID-19 lockdown, as support for
the incumbent increased domestically in other European countries after the lockdown. Importantly, these
findings suggest that incumbents can benefit from a crisis unfolding in other countries, even when their
own performance in response to the same crisis is not yet fully clear. They illustrate the importance of
developments abroad for incumbent approval and the difficulty facing citizens seeking to disentangle
performance signals from exogenous shocks.
Keywords: Comparative politics: political behavior; public opinion
As governments have struggled to suppress the spread of COVID-19, they have resorted to extraor-
dinary and often draconian measures, such as restrictions on individual movements, physical dis-
tancing requirements, surveillance of civilians and border closures. Although these lockdown
measures are extraordinary, so was the public’s initial response to them. Studies suggest that com-
pliance with social distancing and hygiene advice at the onset of the pandemic was widespread and
that public support for policy measures that limit individual freedoms such lockdowns was high
(Fetzer et al., 2020). Notably, incumbents around the globe also experienced rising popularity
(Blais et al., 2020; Bøggild and Jensen, 2020; Jennings, 2020; Leininger and Schaub, 2020). Even
the approval of President of the United States Donald J. Trump, who has faced sustained criticism
for his slow response to the crisis, rose at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak to the highest ever with
49 percent of adults in the United States approving of his performance (Jones, 2020).
This raises the question of whether the increase in governments’ popularity at the onset of the
COVID-19 outbreak was primarily driven by their actual policy response to the crisis or whether
some other mechanisms were at work. There are indications that the sudden rise in government
popularity may not be entirely due to government performance at the beginning of the crisis. Not
only did approval ratings increase in many countries ahead of governments taking action, the
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policy responses to the outbreak varied significantly both in terms of their timing and effective-
ness. Some government leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, were quick to issue grave warnings, others, like President Trump or
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, initially played down the danger of virus. Also, the pre-
paredness to the crisis varied across countries. For example, although tests were widely available
and used in Germany, this was not the case in all other European countries or in the United
States. Nonetheless, incumbents all saw their popularity increase at the start of the outbreak
(Blais et al., 2020; Jennings, 2020; Sibley et al., 2020).
In this study, we aim to delve deeper into this phenomenon by examining how the first
lockdown on European soil affected incumbent support in other European countries. We use
the decision of the Italian government to implement a nationwide lockdown in response
to the COVID-19 outbreak as a kind of quasi natural experiment that allows us to shed light
on the degree to which citizens evaluate politicians in the initial phase of a crisis on the basis
of concrete policy decisions or something else more prospective. We are fortunate that an eupi-
nions survey was in the field in France, Germany, Poland and Spain just before and after the
Italian lockdown, which allows us to isolate the effect of the Italian lockdown before these coun-
tries had a chance to enact their own lockdowns. Our results suggest that citizens in these coun-
tries reacted to the Italian lockdown by increasing support for their governments, even in the
absence of a similar domestic government response. We contend that these findings suggest
that the Italian lockdown alerted citizens in other European countries about how grave the
unfolding crisis was, leading them to increase support for their government.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, our findings contribute to an emerging literature
on the political consequences of COVID-19 by offering systematic evidence that the crisis response
in one country had an effect on incumbent support in another. Second, our results inform the lit-
erature on performance voting by showing that large shifts in incumbent support can occur inde-
pendently of an explicit change in incumbent performance. Third, our findings have important
implications for understanding accountability during crises. Our evidence suggests that in times
of crisis an exogenous shock abroad—not directly related to incumbent performance—may none-
theless affect domestic support for the incumbent. As such our findings highlight the importance of
how developments abroad can affect incumbent approval at home. Our paper adds to a growing
body of literature on economic voting highlighting how international economic developments,
such as commodity shocks or remittances flows as well as international benchmarks, affect incum-
bent popularity (Kayser and Peress, 2012; Campello and Zucco Jr, 2014, 2020; Tertchayna et al.,
2018). Our findings lend credence to the idea that ordinary citizens find it difficult to disentangle
performance signals from exogenous shocks, at least during the early phase of a crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we consider the emerging literature on the effect of the
COVID-19 pandemic on political attitudes and incumbent support. Second, we present our argu-
ment that the Italian lockdown provided a “crisis signal” that influenced support for governments
across Europe. Third, we introduce the specific case and data, namely an eupinions survey in the
field at the time of the Italian lockdown. Thereafter, we present the empirical model and variables
and the results that clearly indicate that the “signal” of the Italian lockdown made citizens in
other European countries more supportive of their own governments. We conduct various
robustness checks to show that this effect holds even when controlling for domestic developments
and restricting the samples to just the period before national lockdowns. Finally, we discuss the
possible mechanisms driving these results in greater detail and consider the wider implications of
our findings for the literature on incumbent approval and vote choice.
1. Why would Italy’s lockdown affect incumbent support in other countries?
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected nearly every aspect of economic, social and political life
across the globe. Although the novel coronavirus originated in China in late 2019, it quickly





















































































































spread to other parts of the world, from Asia via Europe to the United States. By April 2020, vir-
tually every country in the world reported infections, and Europe and the United States were
among the hardest-hit. In the United States, the response to COVID-19 has been deeply political.
Studies suggest that elite messaging from the administration of President Donald J. Trump and
conservative media hosts, like Sean Hannity on Fox News, have produced a differential mass pub-
lic health response among conservative voters who comply less with social distancing measures
(Allcott et al., 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2020; Gadarian et al., 2020). In contrast, the crisis response in
Europe has been far less polarized. Although some of the policy measures introduced in Europe
have been among the most stringent globally, compliance with and support for the restrictions to
individual movements and gatherings as well as health advice among Europeans has been high,
even among those who do not trust the government (Barari et al., 2020; Fetzer et al., 2020)—
albeit with differences based on socio-demographic or personality profile (Brouard et al., 2020;
Zettler et al., 2020).
Early evidence suggests that Europeans rallied around their political leaders and institutions.
Blais et al. (2020) for example use an interrupted time series fielded in March and April 2020 to
study the effects on a set of key political attitudes of the enforcement of a lockdown policy in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors find that lockdown policies rally individuals
around institutions: they increased vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President,
trust in government and satisfaction with democracy. Leininger and Schaub (2020) exploit vari-
ation in the number of confirmed cases at the county level to estimate the effect of the health
crisis on political behavior and find that it benefited the dominant party in Bavaria. Finally,
Bøggild and Jensen (2020) use a panel survey among Danish citizens who were interviewed before
and after the outbreak to show that after the outbreak Danish respondents display higher trust in
politicians, more satisfaction with democracy, more support for the incumbent party and greater
interest in politics.
We contribute to this emerging literature by focusing on how the policy reaction in one
European country has affected incumbent support in other European countries. Our motivation
for this is the observation that the sudden rise in government popularity in Europe appears not to
reflect government performance at the beginning of the crisis, since the change approval in many
European countries pre-dated government responses to the outbreak (Jennings, 2020). Moreover,
we have witnessed a considerable variation in the type of responses, their perceived effectiveness
across Europe and levels of preparedness. Some government leaders, such as French president
Emmanuel Macron or German Chancellor Angela Merkel, adopted a sombre tone, others, like
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson or Stefan Löfven Swedish Prime Minister, initially played
down the danger of virus, highlighting that no real policy changes were needed. Yet, what
these incumbents all have in common is that their popularity increased at the start of the pan-
demic outbreak (Blais et al., 2020; Jennings, 2020).
According to the retrospective evaluation model, voters should reward parties when times are
good and punish them when times are bad. After all, politicians always promise that their policies
will benefit voters. However, the only way for voters to ensure that the politicians in power will
seek policies that benefit them is to evaluate politicians retrospectively based on the past perform-
ance of their policies as opposed to evaluating them prospectively on what they promise to do
(Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). Although there is substantial evidence that policy outcomes,
such as economic performance, correlate with election outcomes, a good deal of debate remains
over how well the evidence aligns with the thesis that voters behave “rationally” (see Healy and
Malhotra, 2013). For instance, studies have shown that voters sometimes evaluate politicians
retrospectively on the basis of outcomes that are seemingly unrelated to public policy, such as
the outcome of sporting events, financial remittances from abroad or natural disasters (e.g.,
Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Healy et al., 2010; Tertchayna et al., 2018). Yet, just because voters
at times punish politicians for outcomes that are outside of their control does not necessarily
offer evidence of voter “irrationality,” since these exogenous events may allow voters to learn





















































































































something about the way in which incumbents manage exogenous shocks and about their level of
preparedness (Ashworth et al., 2018).
Distinguishing between competence signals and exogenous shocks, that is, events largely out-
side of the control of incumbents, is far from straightforward. Although some evidence suggests
that voters are able to tell them apart it when it comes to the economy (Duch and Stevenson,
2008), recent study has challenged this assumption, especially in low-information environments
(Campello and Zucco Jr, 2014, 2020; Tertchayna et al., 2018). Campello and Zucco Jr (2014), for
example, argue that sometimes developments from abroad are the only signal or source of infor-
mation about incumbent competence that voters have and thus may serve as the basis for incum-
bent evaluation.
The immediate effect of the Italian lockdown on the evaluation of governments outside of
Italy sheds light on this debate. From the perspective of those living outside of Italy, the
Italian lockdown reflected a radical policy action of another country to an unprecedented public
health crisis. The question is whether this external event can be seen to provide information to
voters about their own government that can be used to fairly evaluate their performance, in line
with the retrospective evaluation model, or whether alternative explanations are more plausible.
In the days right after the Italian lockdown, voters could not have learned very much about what
their own government was doing to manage the pandemic. As such, the appropriate response
would have been to take a “wait and see” attitude, leaving evaluations of incumbent performance
unchanged. Moreover, even if the Italian lockdown led voters to learn about the policies of their
government, the countries we study had not yet announced major policy actions to tackle the
spread of the virus within their own borders,1 which suggest that this exogenous event had no
direct bearing on the performance on incumbents in neighboring countries. However, in line
with a rational choice perspective, external events, like the Italian lockdown, can provide infor-
mation to voters about their own government by helping them to better understand their coun-
try’s preparedness to crises (Ashworth et al., 2018). For example, after the Italian government
decided to enforce a lockdown, voters in other countries may have felt the need to inform them-
selves about their country’s preparedness for the pandemic. Yet, such a voter response would
require very high levels of political interest and sophistication and, as we will show in the case
description section, we find little evidence of votes actively trying to inform themselves about
their country’s level of preparedness in the immediate aftermath of the Italian lockdown.
So, why did voters uniformly improve their assessment of government parties in the direct
aftermath of the Italian lockdown? Research on communication and psychological models that
highlight the role of issue salience (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder, 2010) and emotions (e.g.,
Albertson and Gadarian, 2015) can provide a plausible explanation for this response.
Psychological models, in contrast to classical rational choice models, incorporate the possibility
that people’s evaluations can be biased by the decision-making context. Anxiety, for instance,
causes people to be more averse to losses, biasing how they process political information
(Arceneaux, 2012). Existential threats require collective responses as a way to avoid losses, and
as a result, they often motivate individuals to cope with the anxiety that it generates by increasing
their support for government and leaders who choose decisive action (Cohen et al., 2004; Kay
et al., 2010).
In this way, the Italian lockdown may have served as a “crisis signal” that made the signifi-
cance of the existential threat caused by the spread of the coronavirus and the magnitude of
the crisis salient in the mind of voters. This bears similarities to other international crises,
such as wars or terrorist attacks, that have also been shown to create a rally-round-the-flag effect,
1Here we examine the effect of the nationwide lockdown imposed in Italy on 8 March 2020 on incumbent approval in four
other European countries, France, Germany, Poland and Spain. In these four countries lockdowns were only implemented
after the initial Italian lockdown. Poland introduced a lockdown on 13 March for Poland, Spain on 14 March France on 17
March and Germany on 23 March 2020.





















































































































driving citizens to rally around the incumbent and giving a short-term boost to their support
(Baker and Oneal, 2001). Although a virus is a very different sort of external enemy, the emo-
tional response of an emerging public health threat could have a similar effect. Despite some
important differences between the various explanations for the rally-round-the-flag effect,
many studies have emphasized that a salient threat engenders an emotional response that moti-
vates people to affiliate themselves with the incumbent, for example, the American president, who
offers a symbolic sense of ingroup belonging and safety (Lambert et al., 2011). One such emo-
tional response is collective angst, a group-based emotion that is elicited when people believe a
threat to the in-group exists. This can motivate specific group-based behavior, and lead to a sup-
port for the incumbent as the embodiment of the nation (Porat et al., 2019). Similarly, as a reac-
tion to the realization that a pandemic was unfolding, many citizens may have increased their
support for their government as a way to manage their anxiety and express a sense of patriotism,
as opposed to a thoughtful judgment of their governments’ handling of the nascent crisis. This is
not to say that these voters are “irrational.” Indeed, it seems likely that as the crisis unfolds they
will update their assessment of their government in light of the way it manages it. Yet, it does
suggest that the way in which they arrive a political judgments at an onset of a crisis is perhaps
more complex than the retrospective evaluation model assumes.
2. Data and methods
2.1. Data
To examinewhether a government crisis response in another country can affect domestic incumbent
support, we leverage the fact that the nationwide lockdown in Italy on 9March 2020 happened dur-
ing the fieldwork of the eupinions survey in four other European countries, France, Germany,
Poland and Spain. Eupinions is an online survey that is repeatedly conducted in a set of different
countries by Dalia Research on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation (see, www.eupinions.eu).
For this study we were able to make use the surveys for France, Germany, Poland and Spain2 that
were conducted between 5 March and 25 March 2020 and comprised of a sample of 5303 respon-
dents in total.3 This allows us to compare the incumbent support of those who were interviewed
before and after Italy’s lockdown. The date respondents were interviewed serves as the variable
Lockdown that assigns individuals to the treatment or control group. The variable Lockdown
takes on a value of 0 for respondents who were interviewed before 9 March and a value of 1 for
those interviewed after, which ends on 25 March when the fieldwork period of the surveys ended.
2.2. Case
Italy was one of the first countries outside China to witness a major COVID-19 outbreak. By the
beginning of March 2020, the virus had spread to all regions of Italy, and the Italian government
became the first government in Europe to impose restrictions to individual movements and pub-
lic gatherings, a so-called “lockdown.” Although some villages in Lombardy and Veneto were
quarantined late February already, starting on 8 March 2020, the region of Lombardy together
with 14 additional northern and central provinces in Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and
2The eupinions survey was also fielded in the Netherlands and Belgium. We could not use the survey data from Belgium
and the Netherlands because they did not include the items required to conduct the analysis were not included in the surveys
fielded in these countries.
3The sampling takes into account current population distributions with regard to age (16–65 years), gender and region/
country. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted based upon the most recent Eurostat statis-
tics. The target weighting variables were age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0–2, 3–4 and 5–8)
and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). An iterative algorithm was used to identify the optimal combination of weight-
ing variables based on sample composition within each country. An estimation of the overall design effect based on the dis-
tribution of weights was calculated at 1.42 at the global level. Calculated for a sample of this size and considering the
design-effect, the margin of error would be 1.1 percent confidence level of 95 percent.





















































































































Marche, were put under lockdown. A day later, on 9 March the government extended the lock-
down measures to the entire country.4
As the first major COVID-19 outbreak on European soil, the Italian situation was prominently
covered by the news media across Europe. It signaled that COVID-19 severity and the speed of
the unfolding situation in Italy signaled the coronavirus was likely to spread across the continent.
To illustrate that the nationwide lockdown of Italy on 9 March was something that grabbed the
attention of people across Europe, Figure 1 presents Google Trends data from France, Germany,
Poland and Spain. Google Trends data provide an overview of the search volume of keywords
used on the Google search engine. In order to make comparisons between search terms easier,
each data point is divided by the total searches in a country on a given day and time range,
and is then scaled on a range of 0–100 based on a topics proportion to all searches.5 We provide
overview of the Google searches for the word “lockdown” (in English or the national equivalent)
for 90 days ranging from 22 January to 18 April 2020. The Google Trends data presented in
Figure 1 clearly suggest that the searches for “lockdown” increased dramatically when the nation-
wide lockdown in Italy was introduced. This suggests that the news about Italy’s lockdown clearly
reached French, German, Polish and Spanish citizens.
One of the most reported aspects of the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy was the pressure on
Italian hospitals and intensive care units (ICUs), in particular. We therefore examine whether
citizens were gathering information on the capacity in hospitals and ICUs in their own countries.
Interestingly, based again on Google Trends data, we find little evidence that French, German,
Polish and Spanish citizens were actively searching for information about their country’s pre-
paredness for the pandemic when the nationwide lockdown in Italy was introduced. Figure 2 pro-
vides an overview of the Google searches for the term “Intensive Care Unit” (in the national
Figure 1. Google trends data in four countries for “lockdown” searches.
Note: This figure shows Google Trends data for the search term “Lockdown” in English or the national equivalent. Google Trends data
give an overview of the search volume of keywords used on the Google search engine. In order to make comparisons between search
terms easier, each data point is divided by the total searches in a country on a given day and time range, and is then scaled on a range
of 0–100 based on a topics proportion to all searches. The dotted line signifies the date of the Italian lockdown.
4For information, see http://www.governo.it/it/faq-iorestoacasa.
5For more information see the Google Trends website: https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533?hl=en.





















































































































equivalent) for 90 days from 22 January to 18 April 2020. As shown, there no clear temporal pat-
tern in the searches for “Intensive Care Unit,” suggesting that while there was considerable inter-
est in the Italian lockdown, it didn’t make French, German, Polish and Spanish citizens actively
search for information about their country’s level of preparedness to a similar outbreak.
2.3. Variables and methods
We examine the effect of the nationwide lockdown in Italy on incumbent support in France,
Germany, Poland and Spain. Incumbent support is captured by responses to the following ques-
tion: Generally speaking do you consider yourself close to one of the following parties? This item is a
question tapping into the attachment to political parties instead of vote intention. Attachment to
political parties is relatively stable (Huddy et al., 2018) compared to vote intention which fluctu-
ates quite a bit (Van der Meer et al., 2015; Bakker et al., 2016). This is the only item available in
the eupinions survey tapping into people’s preference for parties and can be seen as a rather con-
servative test of our hypothesis. On the basis of respondents’ answers to these questions, we con-
structed a variable Government Party Support that takes on a value of 1 if respondents state that
they feel close to one of the parties in government and 0 if not. Except for Poland in which the
government consists of one party (Law and Justice), all other countries in this study have coalition
governments: Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party in Germany, En Marche
and Democratic Movement in France, and Social Democratic Party and Podemos in Spain. Note
that this measure constitutes a rather conservative operationalization of incumbent support as it
taps into closeness to government parties rather than an evaluation of their performance.
In addition, we construct two other variables of interest. First, PM Party Support that takes on
a value of 1 if respondents state that they feel close to the party of the Prime Minister and 0 if not.
Second, due to the recent rise of far right parties in Europe, we include an outcome variable cap-
turing far right party support. Far Right Party Support takes on a value of 1 if respondents state
Figure 2. Google trends data in four countries for “intensive care unit” searches.
Note: This figure shows Google Trends data for the search term “Intensive Care Unit” in the national equivalent. Google Trends data an
overview of the search volume of keywords used on the Google search engine. In order to make comparisons between search terms
easier, each data point is divided by the total searches in a country on a given day and time range, and is then scaled on a range of 0–
100 based on a topics proportion to all searches. The dotted line signifies the date of the Italian lockdown.





















































































































that they feel close to the National Rally in France, the Alternative for Germany in Germany or
VOX in Spain.6
Finally, we include a set of socio-demographic controls: Gender (1 female, 0 male), Urban
Residency (0 rural, 1 urban), Education (1 no formal education, some high school or secondary
education; 2 completed high school, an equivalent diploma; 3 completed a university or equiva-
lent degree), perceived Social Class (1 working class, 2 lower middle class, 3 upper middle class, 4
upper class) and Unemployment (0 employed, 1 unemployed).
2.4. Method
To test the crisis signal effect, we regress our Lockdown variable on Government Party Support.
We estimate a linear probability model for the four different outcome variables using the equa-
tion below. Note, that we include survey weights in all subsequent analyses:
Government Party Support =b0 + b1Lockdown+ b2IndividualCovariates
+ b3CountryDummies+ yi
(1)
By relying on an event that occurred within the fieldwork of an existing survey, we leverage a
so-called Unexpected Event during Surveys Design (Muñoz et al., 2018). This type of design relies
on a core assumption, namely that the moment at which each respondent is interviewed during
the fieldwork is independent from the time when the unexpected event occurs. This allows an
as-if randomization to take place based on the occurrence of the event should.
We test this assumption bymeans of balance tests, shown inTable 1 (further placebo tests are also
shown in the “Results” section). We report the results from two-sided means difference tests on all
socio-demographic variables that were included in the survey. These balance tests reveal that respon-
dents interviewed before and after Italy’s lockdown are very similar, except for a statistically signifi-
cant difference in age and education. Respondents interviewed after the lockdown are likely to be
older and less educated. This might not be entirely surprising given that it seems less difficult to
reach younger and more educated respondents in an online survey, and therefore more likely to
be interviewed earlier in the fieldwork period. In order to account for this potential selection effect,
we add age and education as individual-level covariates to our regression analyses in addition to
other individual level characteristics, such as gender, urban residence, social class and unemploy-
ment status. As can be seen below, the results do not change with our without these covariates.
3. Results
To test our argument, we turn to the results of regression analyses presented in Figure 3. In order
to examine the effect of Italy’s lockdown on incumbent support in France, Germany, Poland and
Table 1. Balance tests
Mean before Mean after Difference p-value
Gender 0.50 0.48 0.02 0.41
Age 42 53 −11 0.00*
Urban residence 0.70 0.69 −0.01 0.49
Education 2.09 1.90 0.19 0.00*
Social class 1.89 1.85 0.03 0.35
Unemployment 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.80
Note: 4815 respondents completed their surveys before the lockdown while 488 respondents after. * significant at the p<.05 level (two-tailed).
See Figure A6 in the online appendix for more information on days surveys were completed.
6Note that we refrain from classifying the Law and Justice party in Poland as a far right party, not least as it features also as
part of our Government Party Support and PM Party Support measures.





















































































































Spain, we regress our Lockdown variable on our two measures of incumbent support, Government
Party Support (most left-hand panel) and PM Party support (second panel on the left). In add-
ition, we also examine if there is an effect of Italy’s lockdown on support for far right parties
(third panel from the left) as well as a placebo test for left-right ideology (most right-hand
panel). We present the unstandardized regression coefficients of the effect of the Italian lockdown
on our three dependent variables and our placebo test in models that include individual level cov-
ariates and country fixed effects (in black) and those that only include country fixed effects.
Figure 3. Effect of Italian lockdown on Government Party support, PM Party support, Far Right Party support and left-right
ideology in France, Germany, Poland and Spain.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients of models with (black) and without (gray) controls. The dot is the point estimate and the
thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Full regression output belonging to
all models can be found in the online appendix, Table A1 (models without controls), Table A.2 (models with controls) and robustness
checks in Tables A2 and A3.





















































































































The results so far show that for respondents interviewed after Italy’s lockdown there was a
significant increase in support for government parties by 4.4 percentage point than those inter-
viewed before the lockdown (b = 0.044, SE = 0.019, p = 0.020) and support for the prime minister
party by 4.5 percentage point (b = 0.045, SE = 0.017, p = 0.010) controlling for the socio-
economic background characteristics. These results lend support for the notion of a signal crisis
effect of Italy’s lockdown, as support for the incumbent increased in other European countries
after the lockdown.
Importantly, when we inspect the results reported in the third column from the left in
Figure 3, there does not seem to be an effect of Italy’s lockdown on the support for far right par-
ties (b = −0.022, SE = 0.016, p = 0.176). This lends further credence to the idea of crisis signal-
ing effect. The decision of the Italian government to implement a nationwide lockdown in
response to the COVID-19 outbreak alerted citizens in other European countries about an immi-
nent and severe crisis that could hit their countries as well. As a result of this, incumbent support
in these other countries should rise, not necessarily support for the far right that run on platforms
criticizing the government.
The results presented so far remain robust when additional tests are performed. First, the
results remain robust against different model specifications, for more information see Section
A.2 in the online appendix. We have restricted the sample to one-week after the lockdown
(Figure A1), controlled for the number of COVID-19 deaths and confirmed cases at the time
the participant completed the survey (Figure A3), performed logistic regression models which
account for the binary nature of the dependent variable (Table A3) and excluding the survey-
weights (Figure A4).
Second, recent study has shown that national governments become more popular after impos-
ing a lockdown (Blais et al., 2020; Sibley et al., 2020). One might be worried that our estimates are
biased by the domestic lockdown effects. To examine this we limit our sample to participants who
are only “treated” by the Italian lockdown—that is, we only include people up to the day before a
lockdown was announced in their country. We re-ran part of our analysis by restricting our sam-
ple to the day before the country of the survey respondent went into lockdown.7 As can be seen in
Figure 4, the results are basically unaffected by this robustness check.
Third, we performed a set of placebo tests. The results presented so far support our intuition
that the nationwide lockdown introduced by the Italian government acted as a signal for citizens
in other European countries about an imminent and severe crisis that could hit their countries as
well and rallied them around their government. This would also suggest that Italy’s lockdown
should not affect other outcomes related to politics that are usually considered to be more stable,
such as a person’s ideology. We test this by replicating the initial analysis but now using a dif-
ferent outcome variable, namely a respondent’s self-reported ideology on a left-right scale
(coded as 1 left, 2 center left, 3 center right, 4 right). The results presented in the right-hand col-
umn of Figure 3 and suggest that Italy’s lockdown did not affect the ideological self-placement of
respondents (b = 0.048, SE = 0.047, p = 0.301).
We also conduct placebo tests and randomly select other dates in the fieldwork period as cut-
off points to create a placebo treatment variable (responses at 5 March 6 March or earlier and 7
March or earlier) (Muñoz et al., 2018). Respondents interviewed before the placebo dates are
assigned to the placebo control group, while those that were interviewed after are assigned to
the placebo treatment group. The results of the placebo tests presented in Figure 5 reveal that
there are no statistically significant differences between those interviewed before or after the ran-
domly chosen dates exist for government party or far right party support when we set the placebo
treatment to 5 March (top panels of Figure 5), 6 March (middle panels of Figure 5) or 7 March
7Lockdown dates are 13 March for Poland (so respondents until 12 March are included), 14 March for Spain (so respon-
dents until 13 March are included), 17 March for France (so respondents until March 16 are included) and 23 March for
Germany (so respondents until 22 March are included).





















































































































(bottom panels of Figure 3). Yet, we do find effects for prime minister party support. Prime min-
ister party support rose already prior to the introduction of the lockdown in Italy as can be seen
by the positive and—marginally—significant effects of the placebo treatments on 5 March (top
panel of the middle column of Figure 5), 6 March (middle panel of the middle column of
Figure 5) and 7 March (bottom panel of the middle column of Figure 5) on prime minister
party support. This might indicate that the effect of the unfolding COVID-19 crisis, as reported
through the media, had already begun to create a rally around the leader (PM) bump that was
then transferred to the rest of the governing parties once Italy put in place the lockdown order.
Figure 4. Effect of Italian Lockdown on Government Party support, PM Party support, Far Right Party support and left-right
ideology in France, Germany, Poland and Spain, sample is restricted to the day before national lockdown.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients of models with (black) and without (gray) controls. The dot is the point estimate and the
thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Full regression output belonging to
all models can be derived from the replication files.






















































































































Our empirical results show that incumbent support in other European countries increased after
Italy’s COVID-19 lockdown, even before domestic governments had responded with similar mea-
sures.Whatmight be the reason for the increase in government approval?Although the nature of the
data presented in this paper does not allow us to isolate the precisely determine mechanism through
which the crisis signaling effect happens, in this section wewish to reflect on the potential channels.
Figure 5. Placebo tests of effect of Italian lockdown on Government Party support, PM Party support, Far Right Party sup-
port and left-right ideology in France, Germany, Poland and Spain.
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients of models with (black) and without (gray) controls. The dot is the point estimate and the
thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Full regression results belonging to
all models can be derived from the replication files.





















































































































In line with the classic retrospective voting model, pandemics as natural disasters can inform
voters about the level of preparedness of the governments regarding these disaster (Ashworth
et al., 2018). In the case of the coronavirus pandemic, as French, German, Polish and Spanish citi-
zens learned that another European country (Italy) was badly affected by COVID-19, theymay have
inferred that their government was better prepared as they had not yet suffered the same fate. This
could explain the initial rallying around national governments. Our analysis of Google Trends data
reported in Figure 2, however, provided limited evidence to support the suggestion that voters
responded to the Italian lockdown by actively getting informed about their country’s level of pre-
paredness. What is more, an implication of idea that people used the Italian lockdown as signal
of their country being better prepared, would be that as this these countries became severely affected
by the virus a few weeks later (e.g., France and Spain), incumbent approval should drop sharply as
performance perceptions are updated. Yet, this does not seem to have been the case as incumbent
approval generally increased during the early phase of domestic lockdown across Europe.8
Using the Italian lockdown to make inferences about pandemic preparedness in your own
country also requires a degree of sophistication among citizens. To explore whether political
sophisticates reacted differently to the external event, we therefore examined heterogeneous
effects in responses to the Italian lockdown based on sophistication, see Figure 6. Political sophis-
tication has often been theorized as a factor determining more or less responsive to new informa-
tion (Arceneaux, 2008; Kahan et al., 2013). The idea is that sophistication makes people more
attuned to information and in this case should make them more responsive to the lockdown.9
The only proxy of political sophistication that is available in our survey data is education,
which is often used as a measure of political sophistication. We plot in Figure 6 the average mar-
ginal effect of the lockdown (1 post lockdown; 0 before lockdown) on the four dependent vari-
ables among those less than high school, high school or university education. As can be seen in
the four panels, there is no consistent evidence that the effects of the lockdown are conditional
upon the level of education. Given that making inferences about government preparedness on the
basis of information about events in another country seems quite demanding, we would have
expected to find some differences across respondents based on their level of education if this
were the mechanism through which the crisis signaling effect worked.
Another channel that could account for our findings focuses on how exogenous events can create
emotional responses that carry over to influence political outcomes (e.g., Small et al., 2006; Healy
et al., 2010). There are various ways in which the Italian lockdown may have also shaped emotions
and political opinion outside Italy. One possibility is that the lockdown made some people in other
countries feel positive emotions, perhaps out of hope that it would limit the spread of the disease or
out of a sense of relief that somebody somewhere was doing something (Egan, 2014).
Another possibility is that the Italian lockdown laid bare the severity of the crisis and the like-
lihood that it would soon spread to other European countries, which increased people’s anxiety.
In times of crisis, anxiety tends to increase trust in government and incumbent politicians
(Lambert et al., 2011; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015). Indeed, some scholars posit that anxiety
and a need for security drives the rally-round-the-flag effect often observed in the face of foreign
threats (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Although the COVID-19 pandemic is not exactly the type
of military threat that lies at the center for rally-round-the-flag effects, it shares features with for-
eign threats. It spreads across internal borders, it threatens people’s lives, and it requires personal
sacrifices to confront. The question of whether people responded to the lockdown with positive
emotions or anxiety (or indeed a heterogeneous response) opens up new avenues for future
research to explore the emotional responses to the crisis, and how they translate into political
opinions and behaviors and the pandemic unfolds.
8https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/21/coronavirus-why-did-european-leaders-approval-ratings-rise-during-lockdown.
9There is also evidence that those with modest levels of sophistication are the most receptive to new information (Zaller,
1992; Elenbaas et al., 2012).





















































































































When it comes to our placebo tests, the results for government party support was more robust
compared to the prime minister support. This might mean that the effect of the unfolding crisis,
as reported through the media, had already begun to create a rally-around-the-leader (PM) effect
that was then transferred to government parties when Italy put in place the lockdown order. This
perhaps indicates that our treatment is fuzzy. As we can see in Figure 1, some citizens of France,
Germany, Poland and Spain were already—but to lesser extent—searching for the word lockdown
on the internet prior to 9 March albeit to a much lesser extent that after the lockdown was intro-
duced. Our treatment, the introduction of the lockdown, is of course not exogenous to how the
COVID-19 outbreak unfolded in Italy. So, how developments abroad affect incumbent support in
other contexts during an unfolding crisis is an interesting topic for further research.
Figure 6. Average marginal effect of Italian lockdown on Government Party support, PM Party support, Far Right Party
support and left-right ideology in France, Germany, Poland and Spain over the range of education.
Note: average marginal effect of lockdown on the dependent variable. The dot is the average marginal effect and the thick bars are 95
percent confidence intervals. Full regression output can be derived from the replication files.






















































































































This paper has demonstrated that incumbent support in other European countries increased after
Italy’s COVID-19 lockdown, even before domestic governments had responded with similar mea-
sures. These results are robust against different model specifications and placebo tests. This evi-
dence illustrates the importance of how developments abroad can affect incumbent approval at
home (Kayser and Peress, 2012; Campello and Zucco Jr, 2020). Our findings thus have implica-
tions for the study of electoral accountability more generally. They suggest that the electorate can
be swayed to support the incumbent by developments abroad, not necessarily confined to the
economic realm. The results also suggest that models of incumbent support should not only
place importance on domestic performance-based indicators, or evaluations thereof, but should
consider a broader range of international developments that may shape people’s allegiance to
incumbent parties. Our findings open up important new avenues for future research to explore
the emotional responses to the coronavirus, and how they translate into political opinions and
behaviors as the pandemic unfolds.
Whatever the precise mechanisms, our findings inform the literature on performance voting
(e.g., Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1981), competence misattribution (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008;
Healy et al., 2010). Our results suggest that a boost to incumbent support in response to quickly
developing crises can be unrelated to changes in performance domestically. In line with recent
study on the effects of commodity or remittances shocks (Tertchayna et al., 2018; Campello
and Zucco Jr, 2020), our findings cast some doubt on the notion that ordinary citizens can always
disentangle performance signals from exogenous shocks at the outset of a crisis.
Does this suggest that incumbents will enjoy a sustained boost to their approval ratings through-
out the COVID-19 crisis? Not necessarily. As the crisis has become more embedded in domestic
politics and crisis response, performance of the incumbent will start to matter more. Just as we
have seen in relation to natural disasters, when governments are often blamed, and held to account,
for their inadequate disaster responses (e.g., Malhotra and Kuo, 2008). In the case of a pandemic
lasting for months or even years, voters are likely to monitor their government’s crisis handling
closely. If so, we expect that governments that handle the COVID-19 crisis well will enjoy a contin-
ued boost to their popularity, while those that do not will experience a decline in support.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2021.6.
Author contributions. Conceptualization: CdV; SBH; KA; BNB; resources: CdV; formal analysis: CdV, BNB; visualization:
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